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ABSTRACT
As Andy Warhol’s famous depiction of a soup can has demonstrated, the meaning of a work depends
on its context. While the Campbell’s label signified one thing to shoppers in supermarkets, it raised
new questions when presented as a work of art. Warhol’s work is just one example of what has come
to be known as appropriation art, an artistic practice that borrows and repurposes images from the
media, popular culture, and other sources. Unsurprisingly, this art form is in frequent tension with
copyright law. This comment suggests that in analyzing the “purpose and character” factor of the
fair use inquiry, courts turn to context—both the images and items surrounding the copyrighted
work as well as the broader social setting in which the work was placed—as additional evidence of
what a work of appropriation art may ultimately mean. It examines two cases in which courts
considered context to determine whether a work of appropriation art was sufficiently transformative.
In light of the Second Circuit’s Cariou v. Prince decision, which dispelled the notion that an author
must clearly articulate his or her purpose, this comment also examines the difficulties that arise
when courts rely too heavily on authorial statements of meaning. It proposes that courts use context
as an additional clue to unlocking the difficult question of meaning.
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A CONTEXT-SENSITIVE INQUIRY: THE INTERPRETATION OF MEANING IN
CASES OF VISUAL APPROPRIATION ART
ELIZABETH WINKOWSKI*
INTRODUCTION
The reader of a fashion magazine flips through ads before stumbling upon “Gilt
Trip,” a six-page feature dedicated to metallic-toned cosmetics. For an instant, one
image catches her eye—a woman’s feet in gold Gucci sandals adorned with
shimmering nail polish. Giving the image only an instant of thought, she dismisses
the fashion suggestion. Moments later, finished skimming, she tosses the rumpled
magazine atop others in a dental office waiting room.
Years later, the same woman walks through the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Museum. She stops to consider Jeff Koons’ Niagara, a colorful oil painting in which
the legs of four women dangle above trays of pastries. Behind the legs, a large scoop
of ice cream hovers above the rushing waters of Niagara Falls. 1 The woman takes a
step back and tilts her head to the side—the legs remind her of the sleek airbrushed
images of a fashion magazine. Yet, set against an unusual backdrop, they provoke
new questions.2
This scenario, based on the facts of Blanch v. Koons,3 demonstrates that images
derive meaning from context.4 This notion is central to appropriation art, a genre
that borrows images and objects from mass media and other sources to create new
works of art.5 For courts engaged in fair use analyses, the question of meaning is

* © Elizabeth Winkowski 2013. J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School;
B.A. Political Science, Boston College; M.A., Creative Writing, Northwestern University. Thanks to
Professor Maureen Collins at John Marshall for inspiring me to write about this particular
intersection of art and law.
1 See Jeff Koons, GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/
collection-online/artwork/10734 (last visited May 13, 2013) (describing Niagara oil painting and
Koons’ aesthetic).
2 Id. The abundant pastries and ice cream in Koons’ painting have been interpreted to reflect
the artist’s interest in “mass media, consumerism, and desire.” Id.; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Koons’ affidavit to the district court, in which the artist
expressed an intention to “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for food,
play, and sex—are mediated by popular images”).
3 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247–48.
4 E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1473, 1481 (1993). Artist Jeff Koons explained this process to the district court in the
lawsuit that arose from Niagara: “[b]y re-contextualizing these fragments as I do, I try to compel the
viewer to break out of the conventional way of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by
mass media.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247.
5 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 260 (2003) (defining and discussing the legal implications of
appropriation art). The practice of appropriation art is also referred to as “collage, bricolage, readymade, found-footage, merz, remix, mashup, sampling, homage, intertext, paratext, [and]
postproduction.” CAROLYN GUETIN, DIGITAL PROHIBITION 37 (2012).
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critical.6 To determine whether a secondary work is transformative, courts must
address what the secondary work means, and whether that meaning differs from that
of the copyrighted work.7 Although courts do not always address this question in
terms of whether the artist has “recontextualized” the image, this comment suggests
that context provides a useful aid in interpreting the meaning of works of
appropriation art.
Part I examines the role of transformative use in fair use inquiry and provides
an overview of appropriation art. Part II analyzes the existing framework courts use
to determine the meaning of works of appropriation art and explores the way in
which context has aided this interpretation. It suggests that a purely author-based
approach to meaning, in which courts rely on the author’s stated meaning in
assessing the first fair-use factor, is problematic. Part III proposes that courts
consider how context alters meaning when determining whether works of
appropriation art are transformative.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of copyright law and explains why permitting
certain transformative use as fair is essential to copyright’s ultimate purpose,
promoting creativity to benefit the public.8 It then examines the theory and
development of appropriation art and concludes with an overview of conflicts between
this art form and copyright law.
A. Copyright and the Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright’s ultimate aim is to promote creativity for the benefit of the public. 9
Copyright fulfills this purpose in two ways. First, it incentivizes creativity by
granting exclusive rights to authors for limited periods of time. 10 For visual artists,
rights granted by copyright include the right to reproduce the work, 11 prepare
6 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1990)
(calling this aspect of analysis the “soul” of the fair use inquiry).
7 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (analyzing whether the
secondary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character” than the
copyrighted work, thereby altering the copyrighted work “with new expression, meaning, or
message”).
8 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
9 Id.; see also Leval, supra note 6, at 1107 (explaining that copyright law is designed “to
stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public”). Copyright
law implicates that this intellectual enrichment is vital to society’s well-being. Leval, supra note 6,
at 1109.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id. The copyright term for current works is the
author’s life plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). In the general parlance of copyright, the
term “author” applies not only to writers, but also to artists, musicians, and other creators. See
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (defining author as “he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature”).
11 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
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derivative works,12 distribute copies of the work,13 and display the work publicly.14
These monopoly rights are granted in exchange for an important public benefit—the
“intellectual and practical enrichment” the copyrighted works confer upon society. 15
Only certain types of works receive copyright protection. An eligible work must
be an “original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 16
Originality requires independent creation and a minimal degree of creativity. 17
Copyright protection does not extend to facts and ideas.18 It applies only to the
particular creative expression that the author uses to communicate. 19 This limitation
aligns with copyright’s end goal of benefitting the public. 20 While protecting an
author’s original expression, copyright permits others to build upon underlying facts
and ideas to create new works.21
The grant of exclusive rights to authors is not the only way copyright law
encourages creativity. Under the fair use doctrine, copyright law permits certain
uses of existing works as fair, allowing unauthorized use even when protectable
expression is copied.22 Without the creative breathing room that fair use affords,
rigid application of copyright law would suffocate the creativity that copyright is
meant to encourage.23 The Copyright Act of 1976 recognizes certain uses of a
copyrighted work, for purposes such as criticism and commentary, as fair. 24
Nevertheless, a valid fair use need not be found among those listed in the Copyright
Act.25 Rather, courts evaluate fair use in light of four factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and
substantiality of the copyrighted work used, and (4) the effect of the use on the
12 Id. § 106(2). A derivative work is defined as “any . . . other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101.
13 Id. § 106(3).
14 Id. § 106(5).
15 Leval, supra note 6, at 1109.
16 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
17 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (noting that only a
“modicum” of creativity is necessary and that the “vast majority of works will make the grade”).
18 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
19 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (2012).
20 See 7-6 STEVEN FISHMAN, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN § 7.02 (2008) (explaining
that restricting copyright protection to creative expression helps prevent copyright from stifling the
creation of new works).
21 See id.
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
23 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (2004); see also Leval, supra note 6, at
1109 (explaining that rigid application of copyright law would stifle creativity because (1) all new
work builds on prior work to some extent, and (2) many areas of intellectual activity, including
scholarship, are inherently referential).
24 17 U.S.C. § 107. Listing several exemplary purposes, the Copyright Act provides that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
Id.
25

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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potential market of the copyrighted work. 26 A court considers all four factors in its
analysis.27 When the first factor is very strong, the other factors carry less weight. 28
Indeed, the Supreme Court and legal scholars concur that transformative use is the
heart and soul of the fair use inquiry. 29 A court is likely to find fair use when the
purpose and character of a work is transformative and noncommercial. 30 However,
when a work is highly transformative, its commercial nature carries less weight and
may be excluded from the first-factor analysis altogether.31
Transformative use occurs when an author employs a copyrighted work as “raw
material . . . in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights, and
understandings.”32 Although courts do not always agree on what “transformative”
means,33 most recognize transformation when the secondary work serves a different
purpose than the copyrighted work.34 While courts may consider both physical
transformation of the original work and transformation of the work’s purpose, 35 they
have found transformative use even where the original work has changed very
little.36 The creation of transformative works furthers copyright’s constitutionally
26

17 U.S.C. § 107. The Copyright Act provides that:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.

Id.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 579.
29 Id. (“[Transformative] works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright . . . .”); see also Leval, supra note 6, at 1111
(explaining that “answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what
extent, the challenged use is transformative”); see also William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the
Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243, 321 (2012) (“Since the Supreme Court's Campbell
decision, it has been clear that ‘transformative’ uses of copyrighted materials are almost certain to
be deemed fair.”).
30 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
31 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (commercialism
excluded from the first-factor analysis when a for-profit’s website’s use of copyrighted material to
criticize cult-like seminars was clearly transformative).
32 Leval, supra note 6, at 1111.
33 Fisher et al., supra note 29, at 322 (defining four judicial interpretations of transformation).
34 Id.; see, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that search engine’s use of thumbnail images was transformative because the images were
used “in a new context to serve a different purpose”).
35 Jeannine M. Marques, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22
BERKELEY TECH, L.J. 331, 336 (2007).
36 H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 351
n.78 (2011) (summarizing cases).
27
28
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mandated purpose—to promote the progress of science and the arts, 37 which
ultimately serves the public.38
B. Appropriation Art: Altering Context to Create Meaning
Appropriation art borrows existing images, frequently from the mass media, to
create new works of art.39 These images originate in advertisements, 40 news items,41
and depictions of celebrities,42 among many other sources.43 The notion that meaning
depends on context is central to appropriation art. 44 Context may be defined as an
image’s surrounding or setting.45 By recontextualizing images from mass media,
appropriation artists often criticize the consumer culture from which these images
are taken.46 Appropriation art does not draw its power from the technical skill of the
artist.47 Its value lies in the artist’s ability to place images into new contexts, thus
altering their meaning.48

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (2004).
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
39 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 260.
40 See e.g., ELEANOR HEARTNEY, POSTMODERNISM 39–40 (2005) (describing the work of Richard
Prince, who in the late 1980s reproduced images of Marlboro Cigarettes’ “Marlboro Man”). Prince
enlarged the advertisements and stripped them of the promotional messages they originally
contained. Id.
41 See generally Fisher et al., supra note 29, at 246–55 (describing artist Shepherd Fairey’s
settlement with the Associated Press, which arose from Fairey’s unauthorized use of a news
photograph by AP photographer Mannie Garcia). The news photograph served the basis for Fairey’s
iconic “Hope” poster for the 2008 Barak Obama campaign. Id. at 244.
42 See e.g., HEARTNEY, supra note 40, at 33–36 (noting Andy Warhol’s appropriation of celebrity
images, including the publicity photograph of Marilyn Monroe he used in the Marilyn Diptych).
Created not long after Monroe’s death, Warhol’s Marilyn Diptych reproduced the celebrity’s image
twenty-five times in color and twenty-five times in black and white. Id.
43 See, e.g., FRANCESCO BONAMI, JEFF KOONS 89 (2008). Koons describes the source of material
for his Lips, painting, which was part of the same series as Niagara:
37
38

[The imagery] comes from a wide range of things. From a box of frozen corn where I
would cut out the individual pieces of corn and make a spiral . . . and taking an ad of
a woman from a fashion magazine and just dropping everything other than her hair;
and lips from a fashion magazine; and a photograph that as in a real-estate magazine
advertising a parcel of land.
Id.

Ames, supra note 4, at 1481.
Id. at 1481 (quoting John Berger’s Ways of Seeing, which states that “[t]he meaning of an
image is changed according to what one sees immediately beside it or what comes immediately after
it”).
46 Id. at 1482.
47 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 3:96 (quoting Sol LeWitt, who states that idea is
paramount in works of conceptual art, while the execution is a “perfunctory affair”); see also LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 5, at 260 (noting that an appropriation artist’s technical skills are often “less
important than his conceptual ability to place images in different settings and thereby alter their
meaning”); see also GUETIN, supra note 5, at 38 (proclaiming that “[c]reativity as we have known it
in modern times is dead,” even though the creative process continues to thrive through borrowing).
48 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 260.
44
45
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By taking images out of their existing contexts and presenting them in a new
setting, appropriation artists challenge and subvert the message that society, and
individual viewers, have previously attached.49 Consider a greeting card depicting
three boys herding a pig into a gift box.50 A consumer may dismiss this image as
overly sentimental. Yet confronted with an enlarged sculptural representation of the
same scene, surrounded by other larger-than-life depictions of cartoon characters and
figurines, a viewer would likely react quite differently. 51
Artists began exploring the power of appropriation early in the twentieth
century, as postmodernism began to take root. 52 Early forms of appropriation art
included Dadaist collages53 and Duchamp’s “readymades.”54 Postmodernism, a
reaction against the notions of formality and stability that modernism embodied, was

Ames, supra note 4, at 1481.
See generally Campbell v. Koons, No. 91-CV-6055, 1993 WL 97381, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1,
1993) (granting summary judgment to photographer of similar image). Barbara Campbell’s
photograph “Boys with Pig” provided Jeff Koons with the basis for his sculpture, Ushering in
Banality. Id. at *1. The work was part of Koons’ 1988 “Banality Show” exhibition at a New York
City art gallery. Id. The Banality Show featured a series of larger-than-life sculptural depictions of
cartoon characters and gift-shop kitsch. Id. Koons did not prevail against Campbell and lost two
other lawsuits based on Banality Show works. See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that Koons’ String of Puppies sculpture infringed copyrighted postcard photograph of
man and woman holding German Shepherd puppies); United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817
F. Supp. 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting summary judgment to copyright holder for “Odie”
cartoon character, which Koons had reproduced in sculptural form).
51 See Adam Gopnik, The Art World, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 20, 1989, at 107, available at
http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1989-02-20#folio=106. According to Gopnik’s review, Koons was
producing some of the most shocking art in the United States in the late 1980s. Id. But Gopnik
found the artist’s power to shock mysterious because everything about the Banality Show exhibition
had such a familiar feeling to it. Id. Surrounded by other larger-than-life representations of
everyday images, the cartoonish characters and kitschy, cuddly animals Koons depicted took on a
“nightmarish” quality. Id. Ames explains this phenomenon:
49
50

[W]hen an artist appropriates an existing image from mass culture, takes it out of
context and places it in a gallery, where a viewer approaches it with the careful
attention many viewers are accustomed to bringing to a gallery setting, the viewer
will often examine that image much more closely than she would if she found it on the
pages of a magazine. In the process, she may (or may not) discover that the values
embodied in that image are values that she does not share when she considers the
issue carefully. No matter what conclusion she draws, the process of looking at the
image, of really “seeing” it, has forced her to consider the operation of a process that
she performs uncritically countless times every day.
Ames, supra note 4, at 1481–82.
52 Id. at 1479.
53 Id.
54 FRANCIS M. NAUMANN, MARCEL DUCHAMP: THE ART OF MAKING ART IN THE AGE OF
MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION 72–73 (1999) (describing “Fountain,” a white porcelain urinal Marcel
Duchamp submitted to an exhibition under the name “R. Mutt” in 1917). The urinal, which
Duchamp purchased at a Manhattan plumbing supply store, is one of the artist’s most well known
“readymades.” Id. Similar movements were occurring in music and the arts. See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT,
Philip Massinger, in THE SACRED WOOD 125 (Methuen & Co., 7th ed.) (famously noting in his
collection of critical essays that “[i]mmature poets imitate, mature poets steal; bad poets deface what
they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different”).
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driven by philosophical and technical upheaval. 55 Advances in science, such as
Einstein’s theory of relativity, toppled the idea of a stable universe, challenging
notions of progress and order.56 Philosopher Walter Benjamin observed in 1935 that
for the first time, humans had the power to duplicate virtually any work of art. 57
Given the ease with which anyone could reproduce an image, art was no longer seen
as the solitary, romantic pursuit of a single individual.58 In his seminal essay, “The
Death of the Author,” French literary theorist Roland Barthes later expanded on this
notion.59 He argued that the reader—not the author—“invented” the text by bringing
his or her own experiences to it. 60
Postmodernism has been called a shift from “production to reproduction.”61 As
commercial, celebrity, and advertising images proliferated throughout the twentieth
century, many artists began to focus their work not on reality, but on representations
of reality found in the mass media.62 By the latter half of the century, images
supplanted nature as the “primary point of reference” for many artists. 63
Appropriation became common practice, 64 made famous by artists such as Andy
HEARTNEY supra note 40, at 6–8.
Id. at 7; see also PAUL GREENHALGH, THE MODERN IDEAL: THE RISE AND COLLAPSE OF
IDEALISM IN THE VISUAL ARTS 104 (2005).
55
56

The single most potent ideological force at the core of modern thought has been that
of progress. Modernity is the response to modernization; postmodernism is a critique
of the idealist response to modernization. Without contradicting these points, one
could easily define idealist modernity as being an affirmation of the idea of progress,
and postmodernism as being a critique of progress and the recognition of its end.
Id.

57 See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 221 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968) (observing that by the turn of the century technology
allowed for the reproduction of all transmitted works of art, causing “the most profound change in
their impact upon the public”).
58 Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf E. Kuenzli, I Collage, Therefore I Am: An Introduction to Cutting
Across Media, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 8–9 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf E. Kuenzli eds., 2011).
59 GREENHALGH, supra note 56, at 238–39.
60 Id. at 239. Barthes was also instrumental in the development of semiotics, the study of
signs. See Ames, supra note 4, at 1478 n.15. Just as Barthes rejected the author-based
interpretation of meaning, semiotics denied the idea that signs—words, images, sounds, and
objects—carry fixed external meanings. GREENHALGH, supra note 56, at 239.

[T]he postmodernists cast us adrift in an ocean of signs, to negotiate our way through
the world by reading it. The world became a text and our perception of reality fatally
compromised, as we read our way through myriad fleeting interpretations of the
things around us . . . The concept of singular, sold, permanent meanings in things, of
known and undeniable principles, of reason as a tool for uncovering final truths,
evaporated into the night.
Id.

HEARTNEY, supra note 40 at, 6.
Ames, supra note 4, at 1480 (describing shift from modernism to postmodernism as a shift
from making “art about Art” to art about culture).
63 Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use, 60 OCTOBER 82, 109
(Spring 1992).
64 Ames, supra note 4, at 1478–80.
61
62
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Warhol.65
Later artists, including Sherrie Levine and Richard Prince, took
appropriation art further through rephotography.66 Adopting perhaps the most
radical critique of authorship, Levine “rephotographed” famous Depression-era
photographs taken by Walker Evans and displayed them with no modification.67 A
development of postmodernism, appropriation arose as a reaction to the increasing
prevalence of media.68 Even if the postmodern era has now drawn to a close, the
practice of appropriation continues.69
C. Appropriation Art in Conflict with Copyright Law
Appropriation art is in frequent tension with copyright law because many artists
employ copyrighted images, in whole or in part, without the authorization of the
copyright owner.70 In the past twenty years, many notable appropriation artists have
been the subject of litigation. Jeff Koons has been a defendant in four copyright
lawsuits, three of which were based on his 1988 “Banality Show” exhibition.71 In all
three cases, the court held that the works were not a fair use, largely because the
court did not perceive the works as parodies. 72 Yet thirteen years later, Koons
prevailed against a claim of copyright infringement under the banner of satire when
he used an image of a woman’s legs in his Niagara oil painting.73 Thierry Guetta, the
subject of a 2011 documentary many critics thought to be the hoax of another artist, 74

65 HEARTNEY, supra note 40, at 33–34 (recognizing Warhol as one of the first artists to
understand photography’s significance to postmodernism).
66 Id. at 36–40.
67 Id. at 36–38.
68 See id. at 7.
69 Barbara Pollack, Copy Rights, ARTNEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.artnews.com/2012/03/
22/copy-rights/ (noting that many artists who continue practice today eschew the term
“appropriation,” which carries with it connotations of criticism, and prefer instead the concept of
“sampling,” drawn from music production). Many artists tend to use images even more freely than
their predecessors, often without the intention to critically comment on the works they use. Id.; see
also GUETIN, supra note 5, at 123 (describing how a new movements in contemporary art have
moved beyond appropriation). The movement known as “objectless, relational aesthetics” treats
artwork as a starting point for conversation and collaboration, rather than a finished product ready
for consumption. Id.
70 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 260.
71 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Koons has also been a plaintiff in a copyright
infringement lawsuit. Kate Taylor, In Twist, Jeff Koons Claims Rights to ‘Balloon Dogs,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at C1 (describing Koons’ claim that bookends in the shape of balloon dogs
infringed his own copyright in his ten-foot tall “Balloon Dog” sculpture). Koons later dropped the
suit. Id.
72 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “even given that ‘String of
Puppies’ is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the
photograph ‘Puppies’ itself”).
73 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247; see discussion infra Part III.
74 See generally Melena Ryzik, Riddle? Yes. Enigma? Sure. Documentary? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2010 at C1. The film began as Guetta’s attempt to create a documentary about the famous street
artist Banksy, but resulted in a documentary about Guetta, made by Banksy. Id. This prompted
some critics to question whether the entire film was Banksy’s hoax. Id.
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lost a lawsuit at the district court level for works based on a copyrighted photograph
of the rap group Run-DMC.75
Other cases have settled out of court. 76 Andy Warhol had many disputes with
photographers that resulted in settlements.77 Following the 2008 presidential
election, artist Shepherd Fairey settled a lawsuit with the Associated Press for his
use of a news photograph, which served as the basis for Fairey’s iconic “Hope”
poster.78
Most recently, the Second Circuit held that Richard Prince’s “Canal Zone” series,
which appropriated Patrick Cariou’s photographs of Rastafarians, was
transformative because Prince’s works manifested “an entirely different aesthetic”
than Cariou’s.79 While the decision is a clear victory for appropriation art, copyright
litigation will likely continue as long as long as artists continue to build on existing,
copyrighted works.
II. ANALYSIS
In assessing whether a particular use is fair, a court must confront the difficult
question of meaning.80 As described in Part I, a transformative work alters the
original work with a “new expression, meaning, or message.” 81 This Part analyzes
how context changes the meaning of an image or object. It then analyzes two
decisions involving appropriation art in which appellate courts have examined how
an artist changed the meaning of copyrighted material through the manipulation of
context.82 It also considers the Second Circuit’s analysis of meaning in the Cariou
decision.83 While an author’s explanation of meaning can be helpful in a court’s
analysis,84 this Part suggests that in determining whether a work is transformative,
complete reliance on the author’s stated meaning is problematic. 85 When an author
is unable be able to articulate his or her meaning, or chooses not to, context provides
additional clues.

Friedman v. Guetta, CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
See, e.g., Buskirk, supra note 63, at 100 (describing settlement between artist Robert
Rauschenberg and photographer Morton Beebe). Rauschenberg had used Beebe’s photograph of a
diver in his 1957 print Pull. Id. Although Beebe had sued Rauschenberg for $10,000, the case settled
for a much smaller amount. Id. In addition, Rauschenberg promised to attribute the original image
to Beebe in all subsequent reproductions of the print. Id.
77 Patricia Search, Electronic Art and the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Cyberspace, 32
LEONARDO, no. 3, 191, 193 (1999); see also Buskirk, supra note 63, at 100–01 (describing Warhol’s
settlement with Patricia Caulfield, whose photograph served as the basis for Warhol’s 1964 series,
“Flowers”).
78 See Fisher et al., supra note 29, at 268–69.
79 Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
80 See discussion supra Part I.A.
81 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
82 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006).
83 Cariou, 2013 WL 1760521.
84 See discussion infra Part II.B.
85 See discussion infra Part II.C.
75
76
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A. How Changing Context Creates New Meaning
Appropriation artists create new meaning by placing images into new contexts. 86
For example, artist Fred Wilson bases his entire artistic practice upon rearranging
and recontextualizing existing objects. 87 In one installation, Wilson rearranged items
in a museum collection in unexpected ways.88 In a grouping of objects labeled
“Metalwork 1793–1880,” Wilson displayed ornate silver pitchers and goblets
alongside iron slave shackles.89 Wilson derived the message of the installation––
critical comment on the way in which museums had ignored African American
history90––from context alone.91
Existing images and objects have particular meanings in society.92
By
manipulating context, artists force viewers to reevaluate the meaning that they
unconsciously assign to such images or objects when they first encounter them. 93
Viewers approach works of art with many expectations about what art is or ought to
be.94 When a work of art challenges or upsets those expectations, “visual dissonance”
occurs.95 Human beings have a natural tendency to try to resolve this dissonance. 96
In this way, modern artwork often provokes viewers to search for resolution and
meaning.97 Andy Warhol’s Thirty Are Better than One, a series of thirty minireproductions of the Mona Lisa, provokes viewers in this way. 98 Viewers are forced
to resolve dissonance between the expectation that the Mona Lisa is a singular
masterpiece and Warhol’s incessant repetition of the image. 99 Placing an everyday
item into a formal gallery setting can create similar dissonance, conditioning certain

86 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 260 (positing that the real skill of an appropriation
artist lies in his or her “ability to place images in different settings and thereby alter their
meaning”); see also GUETIN, supra note 5, at 122 (noting that Duchamp believed that his
readymades should only be protected for twenty-five years at most because if their copyright
outlived the artist, the work’s original context would have changed so much that the work itself
would be rendered meaningless).
87 Fred Wilson, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/fred-wilson (last visited May 14, 2013).
Wilson has little desire to work with his hands as an artist. Id. “I get everything that satisfies my
soul from bringing together objects that are in the world, manipulating them, working with spatial
arrangements, and having things presented in the way I want to see them.” Id.
88 MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART 163–65 (2005)
(discussing Wilson’s 1992 “Mining the Museum” installation at the Maryland Historical Society).
89 Id. at 163. Another arrangement placed a Klu Klux Clan robe within a baby carriage, beside
a photograph of white children posed with African-American nannies. Id. at 163–64.
90 Jean Stein, Mining the Museum, 44 GRAND STREET, 151, 170 (1993).
91 See BUSKIRK, supra note 88, at 163–65.
92 Ames, supra note 4, at 1481.
93 Id.
94 ROBERT L. SOLSO, COGNITION AND THE VISUAL ARTS 122 (1994); see also JOHN BERGER,
WAYS OF SEEING 11 (1972). Assumptions concerning “beauty, truth, genius, civilization, form,
status, [and] taste” come into play when an image is formally presented as artwork. Id.
95 SOLSO, supra note 94, at 122.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 124. Duchamp, for instance, thought that art should provide a “cerebral pistol shot.”
Id.
98 Id. at 126–27.
99 Id.
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responses from an otherwise mundane object.100 Artist Marcel Duchamp created
such dissonance in 1917, when he entered a now-famous urinal into an art
exhibition.101 Given this demonstrable power, context deserves consideration under
the purpose and character factor of the fair use analysis. 102
B. Context and the Judicial Interpretation of Meaning
Use of a copyrighted work for a new purpose, even with little or no alteration of
the original, may constitute transformative use. 103 This has been a dominant trend
in fair use analysis for the past two decades.104 For instance, in Bill Graham v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the court held that use of concert posters in a biographical
book about the Grateful Dead was transformative because the purpose of the use––
telling the story of the band’s history––was different from the original purpose of the
posters, promoting concerts.105 The images used in the book were identical to those
on the concert posters.106 However, because they were creatively rearranged,
recontextualized, and used for a new purpose, the court held that the book was
transformative.107 In light of this trend, courts appear to recognize that context
changes meaning.108
In addressing the question of meaning, the Ninth and Second Circuits have both
used context to guide their interpretation of meaning. In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Productions, the Ninth Circuit held that artist’s Tom Forsythe’s
photographs of Barbie dolls placed into “apparently dangerous” conflicts with
household items constituted transformative use. 109 Forsythe’s series, “Food Chain
Barbie,” depicted Barbie dolls in a fondue pot, malt mixer, and other seemingly
precarious household settings.110 Although the court found the work a parody, noting
that such works enjoy an “obvious” claim to transformative use, 111 the court also

100 See Neil Mulholland, Definitions of Art and the Art World, in EXPLORING VISUAL CULTURE:
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS, CONTEXTS 18 (Matthew Rampley ed., 2005).
101 See NAUMANN, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
102 See discussion infra Part III.
103 See generally R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 484–85 (2008).
104 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK
IN COPYRIGHT 80–81 (2011).
105 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
106 Id. at 607.
107 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 104, at 81.
108 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 556 n.97 (2004); see, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that search engine’s use of photographer’s images, in reduced sizes,
constituted fair use because purpose was to help users locate information); see e.g., Nunez v.
Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that newspaper’s use of a
photographs of a scantily clad beauty contestant, in conjunction with editorial commentary, gave the
images a new meaning or message).
109 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
110 Id. at 796. Another of Forsythe’s photographs depicted dolls wrapped in tortillas, covered in
salsa and placed in a hot oven. Id.
111 Id. at 800.
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discussed how Forsythe changed the meaning of the dolls by altering their context.112
Forsythe’s background and props, among other creative elements, created a context
in which the dolls communicated a new message. 113 While Mattel presented Barbie
as the “ideal American woman,” Forsythe’s photographs depicted a plastic figurine,
eerily smiling in spite of the surrounding peril.114 Without referencing any
statements from Forsythe himself, the court relied on context to conclude that the
photographs commented on “gender roles and the position of women in society.” 115
The court noted that in parody cases, “context is everything.” 116
In Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit considered how context changed the
meaning of a fashion photograph depicting a pair of legs. 117 As described in the
Introduction,118 artist Jeff Koons had incorporated this image into his oil painting,
Niagara.119 In concluding that Koons had changed the meaning of the image, the
Second Circuit both considered context and gave great weight to Koons’ carefully
articulated explanation.120 As Koons stated to the district court, images, as they
exist in society, trigger certain responses. 121 “By re-contextualizing these fragments
as I do,” Koons stated, “I try to compel the viewer to break out of the conventional
way of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by mass media.”122
In analyzing whether the work was transformative, the court focused on the
purpose of the photograph, as created by Blanch and as used by Koons. 123 While the
photographer’s purpose was to create a sexually charged fashion photograph, 124
Koons sought to comment broadly on the “social and aesthetic consequences of mass
media.”125 To make that comment in Niagara, Koons recontextualized a photograph
from the mass media.126 Looking at the image in its new context—the background
against which it was set, its medium, and its placement in an art gallery––the court
concluded Koons’ use was transformative.127

112 Id. at 802 (rejecting Mattel’s arguments that the court “ignore context—both the social
context of Forsythe's work and the actual context in which Mattel's copyrighted works are placed in
Forsythe's photographs”).
113 Id.
114 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
118 See supra Intro.
119 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting affidavit to the district court, in which Koons stated his intention was to
“comment on the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for food, play, and sex—are
mediated by popular images”).
122 Id. at 247 (quoting Koons’ affidavit to the district court).
123 Blanch
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Sharply different
objectives . . . confirm[ed] the transformative nature of the use”).
124 Id. Andrea Blanch, a noted fashion photographer, earned her reputation as “the woman
who knows how to capture a woman.” Biography, ANDREA BLANCH, http://www.andreablanch.com/
root.swf?t=1294931209000 (click “Biography” link at left) (last visited May 14, 2013).
125 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253.
126 Id.
Koons told the district court, “I want the viewer to think about his/her personal
experience with these objects, products, and images and at the same time again new insight into
how these affect our lives.” Id. at 252.
127 Id. at 253.
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Koons clearly articulated why it was necessary to use a copyrighted image to
achieve his purpose,128 stating that he had to use an existing photograph to
“comment upon the culture and attitudes” of the medium from which the photograph
came.129 His ability to justify his use of the photograph eased the court’s decision. 130
Koons stated that the photograph was necessary to provide the painting an
authenticity and reference point for viewers.131 In light of these statements, the
court held that Koons was not merely using an existing image to avoid “working up
something fresh.”132 Broad social commentary, satirizing the very medium from
which the image was drawn, justified Koons’ use. 133
In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit went further, holding that all but five
works in Richard Prince’s “Canal Zone” series were sufficiently transformative even
in the absence of social comment.134 “Canal Zone” featured 30 works based on
Patrick Cariou’s photographs of Rastafarians in Jamaica.135 Through collage,
enlargement, and other distortions, Prince manipulated the photographs to varying
degrees.136 While the Koons court took note of the artist’s broad social commentary,
the court in Cariou focused exclusively on the works. 137 First, the Second Circuit
rejected the notion that a work of appropriation art must comment on or refer to the
original work in some way.138 Second, the court dismissed the suggestion that Prince
needed to articulate with clarity the new meaning or message underlying his
works.139 “What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable
observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of
work,” the court noted.140 “Prince’s work could be transformative even without
commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s stated intention
to do so.”141 What was most critical to the court’s inquiry was how Prince’s works
might reasonably be perceived.142 The court determined that Prince’s manipulation
of composition, color, and scale rendered the majority of Prince’s works
transformative.143
The impact of the Cariou decision in future appropriation art decisions remains
to be seen, and district courts have not yet manifested the same willingness to adopt
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
130 Id. (stating that while Koons’ satirical meaning was clear, the explanation was helpful
because it allowed the court to refrain from relying on its “own poorly honed artistic sensibilities”).
Although Koons’ explanation made the court’s decision easier, the court noted that such
explanations are not required for a finding of fair use. Id. at 255 n.5.
131 Id. at 255.
132 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)).
133 Id.
134 Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
135 Id. at *2.
136 Id.
137 Id. at *6 (“The focus of our infringement analysis is primarily on the works themselves, and
we see twenty-five of them as transformative as a matter of law.”)
138 Id. at *5.
139 Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
140 Id.
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 Id.
143 Id. This framework also led the court to analyze Prince’s works separately, remanding five
works in which “Cariou’s work [was] readily apparent” to the district court. Id. at *2.
128
129
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a “reasonable perception” standard.144 Nevertheless, Cariou marks a dramatic
departure from the Second Circuit’s earlier decisions. For instance, thirteen years
before Blanch, the Second Circuit held that Koons’ sculpture String of Puppies was
not transformative.145 The sculpture was one in a series of twenty comprising Jeff
Koons’ 1988 “Banality Show” exhibition.146 Koons, who had by then built his
reputation on his exploration of art in the age of mass media, 147 based his Banality
Show works on images found in consumer culture. 148 Just as he would do later in
Blanch, Koons identified himself as part of an artistic school that employed mass
media objects and images to comment on the society that created them. 149
Recreating a copyrighted postcard photograph in enlarged, sculptural form, 150
String of Puppies depicted a man and woman holding eight German Shepherd
puppies on their laps. 151 Koons raised a fair use defense, arguing that the sculpture
constituted “a satire or parody of society at large.”152 The court held that this
purported meaning of the sculpture—broad commentary on society at large—did not
fit within the parody defense because the photograph was not the object of Koons’
commentary.153 The court also cautioned against the use of existing images to
comment on society at large because such use would effectively remove any “real
limitation” on the use of copyrighted works.154 The court appeared to suggest that
Puppies might have succeeded as a satire of modern society, but confusingly held
such use was still not “fair” because it did not parody Rogers’ photograph in
particular.155 Unlike Mattel and Blanch, the court did not consider how the new
144 See, e.g., Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 27,
2011) (holding that artist Thierry Guetta’s use of copyrighted photograph of Run–DMC as the basis
for new artwork was not transformative). The court reasoned that because both Guetta and the
photographer were artists, and the image was used in works of visual art, no transformation had
occurred. Id. Even though the two works ostensibly had different meanings, those meanings were
not “so distinct as to render Defendant's use a transformation of Plaintiff's copyright.” Id.; see also
Reese, supra note 103, at 495 (noting that courts have not offered express guidance on how to
determine when a different purpose is sufficiently transformative).
145 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). Bad faith and the commercial nature of
Puppies also weighed against Koons under the “purpose and character of the use” factor. Id. at 309–
10. Independent of these considerations, however, the court refused to acknowledge the possibility
that Koons’ work meant something different from Rogers’. Id. at 310.
146 Id. at 304.
147 Jeff Koons: Easyfun-Ethereal, GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM, http://pastexhibitions.guggenheim
.org/koons/index.html (last visited May 13, 2013).
148 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).
149 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
150 Id. at 305 (detailing Koons’ instructions to artisans to keep the sculpture, “just like the
photo”).
151 Id. at 303.
152 Id. at 309.
153 Id. at 310; see also Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 47–48 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., 1994) (arguing that the court’s
approach discourages artists who rework existing images, requiring appropriation artists to instead
acknowledge their subordinate status in the “‘hierarchy’ of authors”).
154 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. But see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (permitting broad
social commentary as satire).
155 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310 (“[E]ven given that ‘String of Puppies’ is a satirical critique of
our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph ‘Puppies’ itself.”).
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context of the image––its placement in an art gallery, surrounded by other, oversized
sculptures, for instance––may have altered its meaning.156
C. Why Author-Based Interpretation of Meaning is Problematic
Although Mattel and Blanch indicate that courts are sometimes willing to
consider how context changes meaning, courts at times rely heavily on the author’s
stated meaning.157 Courts often operate under the assumption that the meaning of a
work lies with the intentions of the author, who transmits a message to an audience
that either does or does not “get it.” 158 However, meaning is not necessarily
consistent among audiences,159 especially in an art form that deliberately seeks to
challenge and subvert the typical meanings assigned to images in society.
Complete reliance on the author’s stated meaning poses several problems. 160
First, an artist may not have declared his or her intentions. 161 Second, even where
an author has stated his or her intention, an interpreter still must decipher and
understand those statements.162 Third, in some situations, the artist may not wish to
express his or her actual intentions. 163 Other critics note that the idea that an artist
can dictate the meaning of his or her work is relatively new, 164 and that in the long

156 See Adam Gopnik, The Art World, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 20, 1989, at 107, available at
http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1989-02-20#folio=106.
In a review of the “Banality Show”
exhibition, the New Yorker's art critic wrote:

Koons’ sculptures shock not because of their intellectual message or their physical
presence. They are nightmarish. The contours of each piece are as chubby as
Disney drawings, but their execution seems glacially slow . . . Far from being a
detached comment on the place of art in our culture, they have the zombie-like
gleam of something genuinely strange and obsessive.
Id. Based on this account, ordinary images and objects appeared to take on a new meaning than the
original due to changed context. See id.
157 Holland, supra note 36, at 355; see also Jaszi, supra note 153 at 29–56 (tracing the origins of
“romantic authorship” in the development of copyright law, which relies on the author to determine
what a work means). Jaszi contends that the Rogers opinion exemplifies notions of romantic
authorship, depicting Rogers as a pure artist while villainizing Koons as a former commodities
trader. Id. at 42–43.
158 Holland, supra note 36, at 351.
159 Id. at 361.
160 Compare Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (accepting Koons’ stated
purpose: to comment on “social and aesthetic consequences of mass media”), with Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301, 310 (rejecting Koons’ stated purpose: criticizing how mass media has contributed to
the deterioration of society). Relying solely on Koons’ purported meaning, the court reached two
different outcomes, even though Koons’ purpose was almost identical in both cases. Id.
161 Matthew Rampley, The Rise and Fall of the Author, in EXPLORING VISUAL CULTURE:
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS, CONTEXTS 157–58 (Matthew Rampley ed., 2005).
162 Id.
163 Id. Rampley suggests that some artists have deliberately issued contrary statements “to
throw critics and readers off the trail, in order to make interpretation more complex and difficult.”
Id. at 158.
164 Mulholland, supra note 100, at 20.
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history of art, very few people “have been able to proclaim something to be art and
have their opinion taken seriously.”165
Throughout the twentieth century, critics have called into question the authorbased theory of meaning. Barthes166 criticized the author-based approach to
interpretation in the late 1960s.167 In Barthes’ view, the author plays little or no role
in the creation of the meaning of a work.168 Drawing on linguistic theories, Barthes
believed that the meaning of a text was dependent on its relation to other texts, and
that the text itself was a collage of these other sources. 169 Barthes referred to this
relationship as intertextuality.170 At most, the author is an “assembler” of fragments
of other text, and “meaning is as variable as the readings made of it.”171 Rather than
expressing the personal beliefs of the artists, works of art derived their meaning from
their relationship to other works.172
In the latter half of the twentieth century, “reader”-based interpretations of
meaning became more prominent.173 Some scholars have suggested that it may be
more useful for courts to examine what the secondary work has ultimately become,
rather than simply evaluating the author’s stated purpose for his or her actions. 174
New approaches suggest that the meaning of a work cannot be controlled or
transmitted by the author, nor is the meaning consistent across audiences. 175 Each
viewer brings to the work his or her particular background knowledge and way of

Id.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
167 Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142–147 (1977); see also
GUETIN, supra note 5, at 121.
165
166

Michel Foucault, in his famous essay “What is an Author?”, says that the author
is never the origin or location of meaning. Meaning instead is fluid and
changeable, always situational over time. Each work exists in conversation or in
quarrel with other works. All works, he says, comprise quotations from other
works, and “all discourses are objects of appropriation.” The author/artist herself
is a huge repository of pre-ordained knowledge from which she draws, and every
book is a rich network of influences, connections, and imitations. These forces
undermine any notion of authorial intent and so in her absence, he argues, we
should understand the original work to be as problematic as any notion of author.
Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
168 Rampley, supra note 161, at 158.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 159.
171 Id. 158–59.
172 Id. at 159.
173 Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367, 386 n.65 (1994)
(describing “reader response” theory).
174 Mary W. S. Wong, "Transformative" User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing
Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1109 (2009); see also Laura
Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
445, 448–49 (2008), (arguing that approaching the question of meaning from the reader’s perspective
would be more helpful in a court’s determination of “whether the defendant’s use promotes the
delivery of new works to the public, the ultimate goal of copyright law”).
175 Holland, supra note 36, at 381.
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seeing.176 These new theories of meaning have brought to light the shortcomings of
the traditional author-based approach. It is an ideal moment for courts to turn away
from the notion of romantic authorship and bring context into the fair use analysis.
III. PROPOSAL
In light of the difficulty involved in the interpretation of meaning, and the
demonstrable power of context, courts should use context as an additional aid in the
“purpose and character of the use” factor of the fair use analysis.177 Courts have long
recognized that the judiciary should not determine subjective questions of artistic
merit and value.178 Yet in fair use inquiries, courts must assess the purpose and
character of an artist’s use of copyrighted material. 179 Courts frequently rely on an
author’s stated meaning in making this determination.180 However, this approach is
problematic because the author may not clearly articulate his or her meaning, or may
choose not to explain at all.181 Even where an author does explain, courts are still
charged with the task of deciphering the explanation.182 Some scholars have
criticized the outmoded notion of “romantic authorship.” 183 Others suggest that

176 GILLIAN ROSE, VISUAL METHODOLOGIES 19 (2001) (pointing out that there are multiple
sources of meaning for every image related to: (1) the way the image is made, (2) the wider visual
context in which the image is placed, and (3) the audiences who view the image).
177 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
178 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). In
recognizing copyright protection for a circus advertisement, Justice Holmes noted:

It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya
or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the
first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge.
Id.; see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2005) (explaining
rationale behind this viewpoint, including the notions that “art and law belong in separate cognitive
and intellectual spheres,” that “law is objective and art is subjective,” and that law concerns
precedent while “art is about the evolution of ideas”).
179 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
180 See Jaszi, supra note 153, at 29–56 (discussing the notion of “romantic authorship” in
copyright law); see, e.g. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining how Jeff
Koons’ “clear conception of his reasons for using ‘Silk Sandals, and his ability to articulate those
reasons,” aided the court’s analysis); cf. Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d
Cir. Apr. 25, 2013) (pointing out that that “no such rule” requires courts to tie the meaning of a work
to an artist’s own statements).
181 See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Rampley, supra note 161, at 157–58.
182 Rampley, supra note 161, at 157–58.
183 See Jaszi, supra note 153, at 38. “[T]he law is not so much systematically hostile to works
that do not fit the individualistic model of Romantic ‘authorship’ as it is uncomprehending of them.”
Id.
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meaning of a work lies with the audience rather than the creator of the work. 184 One
legal scholar indicates that courts quietly analyze artistic works under aesthetic
theories of their own choosing without acknowledging it. 185 In their effort to avoid
explicit engagement with the question of what art is, courts often do not adequately
explain their reasoning.186
The proposal offered in this Part suggests that in cases of visual appropriation
art, courts should consider context as part of the first-factor analysis in fair use
inquiries. Context includes both the objects and images adjacent to the appropriated
work, as well as the broader social context in which the secondary work now resides.
The proposal further suggests that the author’s stated meaning should be considered
in conjunction with context, rather than in isolation.
A. Using Context as a Clue to Interpret Meaning
In analyzing the purpose and character of a work of appropriation art, 187 and
determining whether the work is transformative, courts should consider the images
or objects next to the appropriated work and the wider context in which the work has
been placed. Courts should recognize that the meaning of an image may change
based on the images or objects immediately beside it. 188 Courts should further
acknowledge that placement in a museum or gallery—the presumed spaces for works
of art189—triggers certain responses from viewers, which can affect the meaning of a
work.190
Permissible meaning should not be limited to comment on or direct criticism of
the original work. Decisions over the past two decades, 191 including Blanch and Bill
Graham,192 as well as Cariou,193 demonstrate judicial recognition of transformative
purposes beyond parody and those enumerated in the Copyright Act. As described
above, the original work in a satire is not “a principal target of scorn,” but “a vehicle
to make a larger point.”194 In contrast, parody imitates the original work to ridicule
184 Heymann, supra note 174, at 448; see Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 502 n.9 (1991) (quoting Roland Barthes, who
stated that a literary, visual, or musical text “is created not in the act of writing but in the act of
reading”).
185 Farley, supra note 178, at 845–46.
186 Id. at 854.
“The result is opinions that reveal little more than incompletely informed,
deeply subjective, highly personal, unanalyzed feelings that an object is or is not art.” Id. Farley
argues that the court dodged aesthetic questions in Rogers v. Koons, digressing instead into a
narrow discussion of parody and commercial use. Id. at 855. Farley suggests that courts openly
embrace particular aesthetic theories and analyze works within these frameworks. Id. at 857.
187 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
188 BERGER, supra note 94, at 29.
189 See BUSKIRK, supra note 88, at 186.
190 Ames, supra note 4, at 1481–82.
191 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 104, at 80–81.
192 Jeannine M. Marques, supra note 35, at 347.
193 Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013) (“Cariou
argues . . . that we are not to consider how Prince’s works may reasonably be perceived unless
Prince claims that they were satire or parody. No such rule exists, and we do not analyze satire or
parody differently from any other transformative use.”).
194 PATRY, supra note 47, § 3:84.
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it, usually in a humorous way.195 Patry suggests that a rigid dichotomy between
parody and satire was never intended by the Campbell decision.196 Courts should
permit satire and broad commentary on society at large, as in Blanch,197 rather than
shoehorning works of appropriation art into the category of parody.198 Appropriation
artists do not necessarily choose images because they warrant particular comment or
criticism. For example, in Blanch, Koons stated that he chose the “Silk Sandals”
photograph not because it was so unique—but because it was ubiquitous.199
Accordingly, Koons created new meaning by placing a ubiquitous image in a new
context.
In assessing the purpose and character of the use, courts should focus on what
the reader might perceive from the image.200 Laura Heymman argues that the
transformativeness inquiry should not focus on what an author has done to create
the secondary work, but rather on whether a viewer may perceive the secondary
work as signifying something different from the original.201 In Heymann’s words,
there must be “interpretive distance,” between the two works and “distinct discursive
communities” surrounding each one.202 While a court may have little information
about how a discursive community perceives the work, context can provide clues.
Id.
Id. (“More likely is that Justice Souter was making a small, illustrative point, and not one
intended to be blown up into a rigid dichotomy.”).
197 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006).
198 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
199 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. Koons emphasized the importance of choosing a photo from the
mass media:
195
196

The ubiquity of the photograph is central to my message. The photograph is
typical of a certain style of mass communication. Images almost identical to them
can be found in almost any glossy magazine, as well as in other media. To me, the
legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world, something that
everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone's legs in particular.
Id. Artist Shepard Fairey adopted a similar thought process in creating his “Hope” work, which was
based on a news photograph of Barak Obama:
I set out to find a reference photo on the Internet that would fulfill my needs. It
did not need to be an extraordinary photo in and of itself; it only needed to be a
sufficient point of departure for what would become a stylized and idealized
illustration of Obama. After several hours of searching for images on Google, I
narrowed my potential reference images for my Obama illustration to six I liked.
After experimenting in Photoshop with the images, I chose a favorite—a reference
of Obama from a 2006 Darfur conference—and began digital preparation for my
illustration.
Fisher et al, supra note 29, at 270. The parties settled in January of 2011, neither party
surrendering its own view of the law. Id. at 269.
200 Heymann, supra note 174, at 455; see also Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521,
at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
201 Heymann, supra note 174, at 455.
202 Id. A discursive community arises around a work as those who experience the work begin to
offer their interpretations of it. Id. at 456. Heymann suggests that critical reception, the secondary
author’s stated meaning, or a reasonable interpretation from the perspective of the courts all
provide evidence of different discursive communities arising around a work. Id. at 456–57.
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Because images have certain meanings within society,203 courts can look to setting
and surrounding images to help gauge what the work might reasonably mean to a
particular community. Context provides the additional evidence needed to interpret
what works of appropriation art ultimately mean to particular audiences.
Finally, in examining the context of an appropriated work, courts should be
willing to analyze works separately. In Cariou v. Prince, the district court analyzed
all of Richard Prince’s works together at once, 204 even though some works contained
more original painting and creative elements than others, as the Second Circuit later
pointed out.205 Similarly, in Friedman v. Guetta, the court considered four of an
artist’s works in toto, even though Patry suggests that at least one of the works was
transformative.206 In reality, each work of appropriation art may have its own set of
context clues capable of creating new meaning.
B. Considering Context in Conjunction with the Author’s Stated Meaning
Context provides a useful counterbalance to the author’s stated meaning.
Without going beyond the author’s stated meaning, the fair use inquiry turns into a
“rivalry of incentivized authors,”207 even though additional meanings may be
possible. Therefore, if courts are to consider an author’s stated meaning, they should
do so in conjunction with context, adopting a mixed analysis similar to that used in
Blanch.208 Courts should take into consideration not only the author’s own purported
meaning, but also the meaning that might be reasonably perceived based on context.
In doing so, courts would retreat from subjecting appropriation artist to the narrow
and standard of “romantic authorship.”209
Balancing context and authorial statements of meaning would provide an
effective approach to analyzing the purpose and character of the use factor. While
some scholars have suggested focusing on viewer interpretation and audience
engagement,210 others have indicated that an author’s stated purpose should be
balanced against some other factor.211 It is necessary to look to context for additional
Ames, supra note 4, at 1481.
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
205 Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
206 PATRY, supra note 47, § 3:96 (referring to the “Old Photo” work, which positioned two
members of the rap group Run–DMC within a nineteenth century portrait of an unsmiling man and
woman).
207 Holland, supra note 36, at 382; see also AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 104, at 20 (noting
that contemporary copyright law, “heavily emphasizes individual authors, individual works, and the
notion that creativity is an individual act”). Aufderheide and Jaszi call this outlook a “truly
unfortunate distortion” in conflict with the realities of modern society. Id.
208 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (relying not only on Koons’ purported
meaning, but also considering the background in which “Silk Sandals” was set, its size, detail, and
“entirely different purpose”). As Heymann describes it, the court still clung to notions of authorial
intent, but also “adopted language indicating a focus on interpretation.” Heymann, supra note 174,
at 461.
209 See Holland, supra note 36, at 359 (“It is a mistake, however, to define the social value at
the heart of copyright solely in terms of authorial activity.”).
210 Id. at 382.
211 See ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, 84–85 (2011) (proposing a two-prong test
for moral rights, balancing an author’s intended message against whether heightened originality
203
204
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guidance as to a work’s meaning because in many cases of appropriation art, the
author’s meaning is unclear.212 If the purpose of copyright law is to promote
creativity for the public’s benefit,213 courts should be willing to acknowledge new
meanings, even where the author has not expressly articulated them. 214
C. Acknowledging New Meaning Does Not End the Fair Use Inquiry
While a context-based approach to the first factor of the fair use inquiry may
result in more findings of transformative use, transformativeness does not end the
fair use inquiry.215 Context may change the meaning of a work, even where the
accused infringer’s fair use defense is ultimately unsuccessful. 216 Nimmer notes that
courts should address the question of transformative use on its own merits. 217 As the
Court stated in Campbell, transformative use is not “absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use,” even though such works often tend to promote the progress of
science and the arts.218 Because fair use is a balancing test, courts should be willing
to recognize new meaning, even if other factors weigh against the alleged infringer.
CONCLUSION
In cases of appropriation art concerning fair use, where a court must interpret
meaning, context provides information that can aid in a court’s analysis.
Interpreting the meaning of a work of art is a difficult task. A work of art conveys
different meanings to different audiences, and artists may not always clearly
articulate their intentions and goals. Given these problems, consideration of context
can help enrich the “purpose and character” factor of the fair use inquiry. As the
court noted in Blanch, fair use analysis should involve “an open ended and contextsensitive inquiry.”219 This comment takes those words literally, suggesting that
courts use context as additional evidence of what a work of appropriation art may
ultimately mean.

and substantial creativity are perceptible to an ordinary observer). Kwall suggests that Koons’ work
in Blanch passed both prongs of the test. Id.
212 Holland, supra note 36, at 360–61 (noting that a work could potentially trigger meanings
and responses that the author never expected or intended).
213 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
214 Holland, supra note 36, at 360–61. Although Prince stated that he didn’t “really have a
message” and did not go to great lengths to explain his purpose, the court did not find his lack of
explanation dispositive. Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV, 2013 WL 1760521, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 25,
2013).
215 4-13 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 13.05[A][1][b] (noting that “not transformative” is often
incorrectly used as a shorthand for “not fair”).
216 Id. (criticizing decisions that confuse “transformative” with “fair”).
217 Id.
218 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
219 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006).

